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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Statement of the Case.
This case involves the specific performance of an option contract for the purchase of

certain real property entered into between two sisters - Wilma Claire Justad ("Justad") and
Phyllis A. Gasser - and their respective husbands. Pursuant to the option contract, the Justads
acquired an option to purchase certain real property located in Harrison, Idaho from the Gassers
for $97,000. Following DefendantlAppeilant Ron Ward's ("Ward") refusal to recognize Justad's
exercise of the option, Justad filed suit against Ward, the Personal Representative of Phyllis A.
Gasser's Estate, seeking specific performance of the option contract. Following a court trial, the
district court found that Justad was entitled to specific performance of the option contract but
denied Justad's request for attorney's fees.

Ward appeals the district court's decision to

specifically enforce the contract. Justad cross-appeals the district court's decision to deny her
request for attorney fees.

B.

Course of Proceedings.
1.

This case originated on June 16, 2006, when Justad filed a Complaint with the

Kootenai County District Court seeking specific performance of an option contract to purchase
real property. (R., pp. 10-19).
2.

Justad filed an Amended Complaint for Specific Performance on June 28, 2006.

(R., pp.20-28).
3.

On July 12, 2006, Ward responded to Justad's Amended Complaint for Specific

Performance by filing his Answer. (R., pp.31-35).
4.

On August 3, 2006, Ward filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking

dismissal of the claim for specific performance set forth in Justad's Amended Complaint. (R.,
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5.

Justad responded to Ward's Motion for Summary Judgment by filing her

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 22,2006.
(R., pp.86-96).

Justad also filed several affidavits, including: (1) Affidavit of Wilma Claire

Justad; (2) Affidavit of Jodi Justad-Hood; and (3) Affidavit of David L. Keyes. (R., pp.74-78),
(R., pp.79-81), (R., pp.82-85).
6.

Ward filed his Reply Brief in response to Justad's Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 29,2006. (R., pp.97-102).
7.

Following a hearing on Ward's Motion for Summary Judgment, the district court

entered its order denying Ward's Motion for Summary Judgment on September 11, 2006. (R.,
pp.103-106).
8.

On September 20,2006, Justad filed her Second Amended Complaint for Specific

Performance. (R., pp. 108-1 17).
9.

Ward filed his Answer to Second Amended Complaint on June 6, 2007. (R.,

pp. 118-1 22).
10.

On October 15,2007, a hearing on the merits of the case was held in the form of a

court trial. In a bench ruling entered that same day, the district court found in favor of Justad,
holding that she was entitled to specific enforcement of the option contract. (Tr., pp.111-132).
11.

On November 16, 2007, the district court entered its Judgment, holding that

Justad was entitled to specific performance of the option contract. (R., pp. 131-136).
12.

On November 19, 2007, Ward filed his Notice of Appeal of the district court's

decision to specifically enforce the option contract to the Idaho Supreme Court. (R., pp.137139).

RESPONDENT'S 1 CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF
L:\~JUSTAD025389\APPEAL00002\PLOG\BRI;S\RESPONDENT'S
BRIEF-040108-PRH-PJS.DOC

13.

On November 20,2007, Justad, as the prevailing party, filed her Memorandum of

Fees and Costs, seeking recovery of the attorney's fees and costs she incurred in pursuing this
action. (Supp. R., pp.8-27).
14.

Ward objected to Justad's request for attorney fees and costs on December 4,

2007. (Supp. R., pp.28-29).
15.

Following oral argument on the issues of attorney's fees and costs on

December 17,2007, the district court took the issues under advisement. (Supp. R., p.30)
16.

In a written decision issued on January 11, 2008, the district court granted all

costs requested by Justad, but denied Justad's request for attorney's fees. (Supp. R., pp.30-41).
17.

On January 29, 2008, Justad filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal of the district

court's decision to deny her request for attorney's fees to the Idaho Supreme Court. (Supp. R.,
pp.42-44).
C.

Statement of the Facts
On May 8, 1978, Justad and her husband R.W. Justad entered into two written

agreements with Justad's sister Phyllis Gasser (hereinafter "Decedent") and her husband John
~ a s s e r . ' (Justad Aff., R., p.75). The first was a contract of sale, wherein the Gassers agreed to
sell and the Justads agreed to purchase approximately 113 acres of real property located in
Harrison, Idaho, more particularly described in Plaintiffs Exhibit 2.'

(Justad Aff., R., p.75);

(Tr., pp.23-26). The second was an option contract, wherein the Justads acquired an option to
purchase certain lake kont property located in Harrison from the Gassers, more particularly
described in Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. (Justad Aff., R., p.75); (Tr., pp.26-30). The parcel of lake

'

Justad and her sister Phyllis Gasser were very close and maintained a good relationship throughout their lives.
(Tr., p.21, 11.9-1 1). Even though she relocated to Boise since 1949, Justad would ttavel to Harrison at least four to
five times a year to visit and spend time with Phyllis. (Tr. p.21, 11.13-25).
The contract for sale is not at issue in this case.
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front property described in the option contract is located adjacent to the 113 acres of real
property the Justads obtained through the contract for sale. (Justad Aff., R., p.75). The option
agreement entered into was in writing and signed by the parties, consisting of Justad, Justad's
husband R.W. Justad, Decedent, and Decedent's husband John Gasser. (Option Contract, R.,

The purchase price of the property under the option was to be $97,000, "payable in equal
annual installments from the date of exercise of said Option over a ten (10) year period of time,
without interest upon the unpaid principal balance." (Option Contract, R., p. 114); (Tr. p.28,11.48). With respect to the exercise of the option, the option provided:
This Option may be exercised upon the mutual consent of all the parties to this
Agreement, in writing, or the JUSTED's [sic] may elect to exercise said Option
upon the deaths of both JOHN W. GASSER and PHYLLIS A. GASSER.
Provided, that said election shall be exercised within sixty days of the death of the
last to die, and said election shall be binding upon the Personal Representatives
and Trustees and Estates of the GASSER'S. If the election is not exercised within
said period of time, then this Option shall terminate, together with all rights
hereunder.
(Option Contract, R., pp.114-115); (Tr. pp.28-29).

The parties did not record the option;

however Justad and Decedent each retained a copy. Of the parties to the option contract, John
Gasser died in 1984 (Tr., p.22, 11.1-3); (Tr., p.30, 11.16-18), R.W. Justad died in 2003 (Justad
Aff,, R., p75), and Decedent died on February 19,2006. (Justad Aff., R., p.74), leaving Justad as
the only surviving party.
Following Decedent's death, Justad sought to exercise to the option to purchase the
property described in the option contract.

(Justad Aff., R., p.76); (Tr., pp.34, 11.23-25).

However, the option contract was silent as to whom notice should be given in the event it is
exercised following the death of the Gassers/Optionors. Upon receiving notice that a hearing
would be held before the Magistrate Court in Kootenai County for the appointment of
RESPONDENT'S I CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Decedent's personal representative on April 11, 2006, Justad instructed her daughter, Jodi
Justad-Hood ("Justad-Hood"), to travel to Coeur d'Alene to attend a hearing. (Justad Aff., R.,
p.76); (Tr., p.36,ll.I-16).
The sole purpose of Justad-Hood's attendance at the April 11 hearing was to convey
Justad's intent to exercise the option to the Court and Ward, should he have been appointed
personal representative of Decedent's estate. (Justad Aff., R., p.76); (Tr., p.36, 11.1-16). JustadHood attended the April 11 hearing on behalf of Justad. (Justad-Hood Aff., R., p.80). Also, in
attendance at the April 11 hearing was Ward, who saw, recognized, and heard

us tad-~ood.~

(Tr., p.84, 11.3-13). At the hearing, Justad-Hood attempted to communicate Justad's intent to
exercise the option to purchase the property on Justad's behalf. (Justad-Hood Aff., R., p.80).
However, Justad-Hood was prevented, by the Magistrate Court, firon1 fully communicating
Justad's intent to exercise the option. (Justad-Hood Aff., R., p.80). Justad-Hood's presence at
the hearing was understood by the Magistrate Court to be an objection to the appointment of
Ward as personal representative of Decedent's estate. The Magistrate Court, having no prior
notice of any objection to the appointment of Ward, cut Justad-Hood's statement short and
rescheduled the hearing to June 15,2006. At the hearing on June 15,2006, Ward was appointed
personal representative of Decedent's estate. (Tr., p.83, 11.12-14).

That same day, Justad

provided written notice to Ward of her intent to exercise the option. (Tr., p.85-86).
Ward, at all pertinent times, refused to recognize Justad's exercise of the option. It was
in Ward's personal interest to refuse to recognize Justad's exercise of the option. Ward not only
administered Decedent's estate, but stands to inherit under the terms of Decedent's Will. (Tr,,
p.128,11.2-4); (Supp. R., p.31). As a result, Ward has a lot to gain in the event that Justad does
not exercise the option, being that he would inherit one-third of the option property under
Ward is and was a nephew of both Justad and Decedent, and a cousjn of Justad-Hood. (Tr., pp.82-83).
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Decedent's Will. (Tr., p.128, 11.2-4); (Supp. R., p.31). Due to Ward's refusal to recognize
Justad's exercise of the option, Justad filed a Complaint with the Kootenai County District Court
on June 16, 2006, seeking specific performance of the option contract to purchase real property.
(R., pp.10-19).
Following a court trial conducted on October 15, 2007, the district court entered its bench
ruling, holding that Justad was entitled to specific performance of the option contract she entered
into with the Gassers. ( T , I - 1 3 2 ) . Specifically, the district court held that Justad timely
exercised her option to purchase the Subject Property on April 11, 2006. (Tr., p,l12, 11.1-3);
(Tr., p.115, 11.16-17).

Alternatively, the district court held that Justad exercised her option

through her attorney on June 15, 2006. (

r1

I I- 2

) (Tr., pp.117- 1 8 The district court

subsequently entered its Judgment on November 16, 2007, declaring that Justad was entitled to
specific performance of the option contract. (R., p.131-136). Ward appeals the district court's
bench decision and its Judgment entered on November 16,2007. (R., p.137-139).
Even though the district court found that Justad was the prevailing party, it denied her
claims for attorney's fees in its Memorandum Decision and Order dated January 11, 2008.
(Supp. R., pp.30-41). Justad cross-appeals the district court's decision to deny her request for
attorney fees as the prevailing party in this action. (Supp. R., pp.42-44)
11. ISSUES

Justad addresses those three issues advanced in Appellant's Brief at page 4, but re-casts
them in the following terms and order:
(1)

Whether the district court's decision to specifically enforce the option contract
exceeded the broad discretion given to trial courts to grant or deny requests for
specific performance.
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(2)

Whether the district court's finding that Justad's agent Justad-Hood timely
exercised Justad's option at the April 11, 2006 hearing is supported by substantial
and competent evidence.

(3)

Whether the district court correctly ruled that, in the alternative to her timely
exercise of the option on April 11, 2006, Justad also timely exercise the option on
June 15,2006.

In addition, Justad advances as additional issues on appeal the following:
(4)

Whether the district court erred in denying Justad's request for attorney's below.

(5)

Whether Justad is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.

(6)

Whether Ward waived any claim he may have to attorney fees and costs at the
district court level and on appeal by failing to raise the issue of fees and costs in
his Appellant's Brief.
111. ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review - Abuse of Discretion.
In this case Justad sought, and the district court granted, specific performance of the

option contract. "Specific performance is an extraordinary remedy that can provide relief when
legal remedies are inadequate." Kessler v. Tortoise Development, Inc., 134 Idaho 264, 270, 1
P.3d 292, 298 (2000). Due to the perceived uniqueness of land, it is presumed that damages are
inadequate in an action involving an option contract for the purchase and sale of land, and the
non-breaching party need not make a separate showing of the inadequacy of damages. Id.
This Court has previously held that the decision to grant specific performance is a matter
within the district court's discretion. Kessler v. Tortoise Development, Inc., 134 Idaho 264, 270,
1 P.3d 292, 298 (2000). As such, a district court's decision to grant or deny parties' request for
specific performance will not be overturned on appeal short of a showing that the district court
RESPONDENT'S I CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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abused its discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion review requires a three-part inquiry: (1)
whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court
acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 28, 175 P.3d 186, 190 (2007). The burden is on the
appealing party to establish that the district court abused its discretion. See Zimrnerman v.

Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851,857,920 P.2d 67,73 (1996).
B.

In specifically enforcing the option contract in this case, the district court did not
abuse the broad discretion given to trial courts to grant or deny requests for specific
performance.
In this case, as will be set forth in detail below, the district court did not abuse its

discretion by specifically enforcing the option contract. The record establishes that the district
court perceived the issue of whether to grant Justad's request for specific performance as one of
discretion. In so granting Justad's request, the district court did not exceed the boundaries of its
discretion, and the district court reached its decision to grant Justad's request by an exercise of
reason. Ward raises three main issues on appeal in his attempt to persuade this Court that the
district court abused its discretion by specifically enforcing the option contract, consisting of the
following: (1) the district court erred in specifically enforcing the option agreement because it is
unenforceable; (2) the district court erred in finding that Justad timely exercised the option on
April 11, 2006; and (3) the district court erred in finding that Justad timely exercised the option
on June 15, 2006. (Appellant's Brief, p.4). Each argument will be addressed in turn, albeit in a
different order than presented in Ward's Appellant's Brief. The first issue to be addressed will
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be whether the option contract is valid and enforceable, followed by the issue of whether Justad
timely exercised her rights under the option.

1.

The district court correctly held that the option contract contained

sufficiently complete material terms so as to be valid and enforceable.
In its bench ruling, the district court held that the option contract was sufficiently
complete, definite, and certain in all its material terms to be enforceable through a decree of
specific performance. (Tr., p. 11 1,ll. 18-19). Ward argues on appeal that the district court erred
in so holding because the option agreement is lacking in essential terms and is not enforceable as
a result. (Appellant's Brief, p.11). Ward also argues that the district court erred in finding that
certain terms were implied into the option contract. For the reasons set forth below, the option
contract contained sufficiently complete material terms to be enforceable, and the district court
did not err in finding that certain terms were contained in the contract by implication.

(a)

The option contract contained all the terms required under Idaho taw

to be valid and enforceable.
With respect to contracts generally, this Court has held that a contract will be enforced if
it is "complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contains provisions which are
capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty." Spence v. Howell, 890 P.2d 714, 721, 126
Idaho 763, 770 (1995). However, this Court does hold the contracting parties to a standard of
absolute certainty relative to every detail of a contract, but rather, only reasonable certainty is
necessary before a contract will be given legal effect so as to be enforceable. Barnes v. Huck, 97
Idaho 173, 178, 540 P.2d 1352, 1357 (1975). Furthermore, this Court has made clear that Idaho
law "does not favor, but leans against, the destruction of contracts because of uncertainty; and it
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will, if feasible, so construe agreements as to carry into effect the reasonable intentions of the
parties if that can be ascertained." Id.
A similar approach has been taken in Idaho with respect to the specific performance of
real estate contracts. With respect to the specific performance of real estate contracts, this Court
has held that specific performance will not be granted unless the contract is "complete, definite
and certain in all of its material terms, or contains provisions which are capable in themselves of
being reduced to certainty." Locklear v. Tucker, 69 Idaho 84,90, 203 P.2d 380, 383-84 (1949).
However, as is the case with contracts generally, this Court does hold the contracting parties to a
standard of absolute certainty relative to every detail of an option contract, and "uncertainty in a
subsidiary part of an [option] agreement whose main particulars are sufficiently certain, will not
prevent a decree of specific performance." Id. (emphasis added). The Idaho Court of Appeals
has held that an option contract for the purchase of real property must be certain "as to the price,
manner of payment, and description of real property" to be specifically enforceable. Dante v.

Golas, 121 Idaho 149,823 P.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1992).
In Dante, the parties entered into an agreement to lease a house, which agreement
contained an option to purchase the house. 121 Idaho at 150, 823 P.2d at 184. When the lessors
refused to recognized the lessees' exercise of the option to purchase the house, the lessees sued
for specific performance. Id. On appeal, the lessors argued that the district court erred in
specifically enforcing the option contract because certain material terms were uncertain, thus
rendering the contract unenforceable. Id. at 152, 823 P.2d at 186. In addition to asserting that
the purchase price of the contract was uncertain, the lessors argued that the contract fatally
lacked the following terms:
(1) the identity of the loan; (2) the identity of the lender; (3) the interest rate on
the loan; (4) the amount of the monthly mortgage payments; (5) the outstanding
RESPONDENT'S / CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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balance on the loan; (6) the consideration to be paid for the option to purchase; (7)
the amount and method of payment of any additional amounts constituting the
[Lessors'] equity; (8) whether the assumption was to be a simple assumption or
whether the [Lessors'] were to be released from their underlying obligation on the
loan; and (9) the [Lessors'] remedies if the buyers defaulted on the mortgage.

Id.

The Idaho Court of Appeals disagreed, and affirmed the district court's decision to

specifically enforce the option contract, holding that the above-complained of terms were either
certain, could be reduced to certainty, or were not essential terms to the validity of the option
contract. Id. at 152-53,823 P.2d at 186-87.
With respect to the pricing term, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the purchase price
and terms of payment "could easily have been reduced to certainty," dependant on when the
lessees decided to exercise the option. Id. at 152,823 P.2d at 186. The court went onto hold that
the first five complained of items were readily ascertainable at any time the lessees decided to
exercise the option to purchase, thus holding that they could be reduced to certainty. Id. With
respect to the term of consideration for the option contract, the court held that the monthly rent
payment and commitment to rent satisfied the term. Id. With respect to the seventh term the
court held it was irrelevant and not supported by the record. Id. The contract was found by the
court to contain a provision establishing the eighth term, and finally with respect ninth term seller's remedies - the court held that remedies in the event of breach was not a material term
required to have an enforceable contract. Id.
The rule laid down by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Dante that an option contract for the
purchase of real property must be certain "as to the price, manner of payment, and description of
real property" to be specifically enforceable is consistent with the generally recognized rule that
an option to purchase real property is valid and enforceable if it contains the following: (1) an
agreement conferring a right to buy; (2) certain described property; (3) a fixed period of time:
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and (4) a stated price. 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser

5 28 (2006); see e.g., Tachdjian v.

Phillips, 568 S.E.2d 64,66 (Ga. App. 2002).
In this case, the option contract in question is definite and certain as to its material terms
so as to be enforceable andlor, in the alternative, contains provisions which are capable in
themselves of being reduced to certainty so as to be enforceable. First, the option contract
contained an agreement conferring a right to buy to Justad, as well as an acknowledgement of the
$100 paid by Justad in consideration of the option:

IN CONSIDERATION of the sum of ONE HUNDRED & no1100 DOLLARS,
receipt of which is acknowledged, JOHN W. GASSER and PHYLLIS A.
GASSER, husband and wife, grant to R.W. JUSTAD and CLAIRE JUSTAD,
husband and wife, the exclusive option to purchase the real property described in
Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
(Plaintiff's Ex. 3) (R., p. 114). Second, the price term of the option contract was clearly provided
for, as the option contract expressly stated a price term of $97,000. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 3); (R.,
p.114). Third, the option contract expressly stated the manner of payment, providing that the
purchase price of $97,000 "shall be payable in equal annual installments from the date of
exercise of said Option over a ten (10) year period of time, without interest upon the unpaid
balance." (Plaintiff's Ex. 3); (R., p.114). Forth, the option fixed a period of time in which the
option could be exercised:
This Option may he exercised upon the mutual consent of all the parties to this
Agreement, in writing, or the JUSTED's [sic] may elect to exercise said Option
upon the deaths of both JOHN W'. GASSER and PHYLLIS A. GASSER.
Provided, that said election shall be exercised within sixty days of the death of the
last to die, and said election shall be binding upon the Personal Representatives
and Trustees and Estates of the GASSER'S. If the election is not exercised within
said period of time, then this Option shall terminate, together with all rights
hereunder.
(Plaintiffs' Ex. 3); (R., p.114). Last, Exhibit "A" attached to the option contract provided the
property description. (Plaintiffs' Ex. 3); (R., p.114). Thus, the option contract contains all the
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terms required to be valid and enforceable, and the district court did not err in holding that it is
enforceable.
Notwithstanding the fact that the option contract at issue contains an agreement
conferring a right to buy, is certain and definite as to price, manner of payment, and contains a
description of property, Ward argues that the option contract is unenforceable. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.11-16). Ward's primary concerns seem to be that the option contract did not provide
for the seller's remedy in the case of non-payment (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16) and that the
district court erroneously implied certain terms into the option contract. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.12-13). With respect to Ward's first concern regarding remedy in the case of non-payment or
breach, the Court of Appeals in Dante specifically held that a provision providing for remedies is
not an essential term of an option contract so as to render an option contract unenforceable in its
absence. 121 Idaho at 152,823 P.2d at 186.

(b)

Idaho law recognizes that in every contract there exists not only

express terms, but also those implied terms which are necessary to effectuate the
intent of the parties.
Ward's assertions that the option contract in unenforceable because the district court
found that certain terms were implied is unfounded. The district court in this case found that the
option contract at issue contained certain implied terms, citing to Star Phoenix Min. Co. v. Hecla

Min. Co., 130 Idaho 223, 939 P.2d 542 in support of its finding. (R. pp.,124-127).

Ward

complains of the following terms, which the district court found were contained in the contract as
implied terms: (1) the due date of the first and second installment payments, and the interest to
be paid on those installment payments; (2) the application of the $100 that was given in
consideration of the option to purchase price; (3) the payment of property taxes; (4) the
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conveyance of the deed; (5) whether prepayment is permitted; (6) when Justad is entitled to
possession; and (7) Ward's remedies in the event of default. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13). For
the reasons stated below, the district court did not err in finding that the option contract
contained certain implied terms.
As an initial matter, it should be noted that none of implied terms complained of by Ward
are essential terms required under Idaho law for the valid formation of an enforceable option
contract. See Dante, 121 Idaho at 149, 823 P.2d at 183 (an option contract for the purchase of
real property must be sufficiently certain "as to the price, manner of payment, and description of
real property" to be enforceable). As set forth in detail above, the option contract in this case
contained all the essential terms required of an option contract under Idaho law to be valid and
enforceable. Thus, Ward's assertions that the district court somehow erred in finding that the
option contract contained certain implied terms cannot render the contract unenforceable or
invalid.
With respect to the finding of implied terms in a contract, this Court made clear that there
exist both express and implied terms in a contract, and that implied terms are as much a part of
the contract as express terms:
In every contract there exist not only the express promises set forth in the contract
but all such implied provisions as are necessary to effectuate the intention of the
parties, and as arise from the specific circumstances under which the contract was
made. In implying terms to a contract that is silent on the particular matter in
question, only reasonable terms should be implied. Such implied terms are as
much a part of the contract as those which are express.
130 Idaho at 231, 939 P.2d at 550 (emphasis added), (quoting, Davis v. Professional Business

Services, Inc., 109 Idaho 810, 813-14, 712 P.2d 51 1, 514-15 (1985)). This Court has further
stated that "terms are to be implied in a contract. . . because they are necessarily involved in the
contractual relationship so that the parties must have intended them." Id. (quoting, Archer v.
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Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 102 Idaho 852, 642 P.2d 943 (1982)). Likewise, it is generally held
that "[wlhere a contract fails to specify all the duties and obligations intended to be assumed, the
law will imply an agreement to do those things that according to reason and justice the parties
should do in order to cany out the purpose for which the contract was made. 17A Am. Jur. 2d
Contracts § 368 (emphasis added).
In this case, the district court did nothing more than find that the option contract
contained certain implied terms "as [were] necessary to effectuate the intention of the parties,"
and "carry out the purpose for which the contract was made," consistent with Idaho law. Star

Phoenix Min. Co., 130 Idaho at 231, 939 P.2d at 550; 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 368. The
district court found justification for the implication of the above-mentioned terms as a result of
the clear intentions of the parties to the option contract as expressed by the terms of the option
contract. The express language of the option contract, as well as the evidence presented at trial,
clearly established that it was the parties' intent that Justad have the option to purchase the lake
front property described in the option following the death of the Gassers/Optionors. (Plaintiffs
Ex. 3).
In addition, the district court found further justification for the implication of terms based
on the specific circumstances under which the contract was made, consistent with Idaho law.

Star Phoenix Min. Co., 130 Idaho at 231, 939 P.2d at 550; 17.4 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts 5 368.
Specifically, the court took into account the fact that the contract for sale, wherein the Gassers
agreed to sell and the Justads agreed to purchase approximately 113 acres of property adjoining
the option property, was entered into the same day as the option contract. (Tr., p.125, 11.11-24).
Give that such was the case, the district court looked to the terms of the contract for sale to assist
in determining certain terms that were implied into the option contract. (Tr., p.125, 11.11-24).
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Thus, in finding that the option contract contained certain implied terms, the district court did not
err so as to make the contract unenforceable, but rather merely implied such provisions and terms
as were necessary to effectuate the intention of the parties consistent with Idaho law.
In sum, the district court correctly found that the option contract was sufficiently definite
and certain in its terms so as to be enforceable under Idaho law, and did not err in finding that
option contract certain implied terms as were necessary to effectuate the intention of the parties.
Thus, the remaining issue is whether, given the valid and enforceable option contract, Justad
exercised her rights under the contract.
2.

The district court correctly found that Justad exercised the option on

April 11,2006.
In its bench ruling, the district court found as a matter of fact that Justad timely exercised
the option on April 11, 2006, fifty-one (51) days after Decedent's death. (Tr., p.112, 11.1-3);
(Tr., p. 115, 11.16-17). Ward challenges this ruling of the district court on appeal, arguing that the
district court's finding that Justad timely exercised the option on April 11, 2006 should be
overturned because it is unsupported in the record. (Appellant's Brief, p.4). However, Ward's
argument to this effect lacks merit because the district court's finding that Justad timely
exercised the option on April 11,2006, is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
(a)

The district court's finding that Ward received notice of Justad's

intent to exercise the option on April 11,2006, is supported by substantial and
competent evidence in the record.
This Court has held that "[a] trial court's findings of fact in a court tried case will be
liberally construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as
trier of fact." Bennigev v. Derzpeld, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006). A trial
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court's findings of fact will only be set aside if they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Lovitt

v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 325, 78 P.3d 389, 392 (2003). Findings of fact are not clearly
erroneous when they are supported by substantial and competence evidence. Viebrock v. Gill,
125 Idaho 948, 951, 877 P.2d 919, 922 (1994). "Evidence is substantial and competent if a
reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it." Lovitt, 139 Idaho at 325, 78 P.3d at 392.
Findings of fact based upon substantial and competent evidence will not be overturned on appeal
even if the evidence is conflicting. Benniger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238 (2006). "It is
the province of the district judge acting as trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence and
testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Id.
Ward attempts to circumvent the above-mentioned standard of review with respect to a
trial court's finding of facts in a court trial by citing to Airstream, Inc. v. CIT Financial Services,

Irrc., 115 Idaho 569, 768 P.2d 1302. (Appellant's Brief, p.4). Ward relies upon this case to argue
that the Court can independently review the evidence in this case, and disregard the trial court's
findings, on the grounds that the record is entirely documentary. (Appellant's Brief, p.4).
Ward's assertion of the evidence presented in this case as "entirely documentary," is erroneous,
since the district court's finding that Justad exercised the option on April 11, 2006, is supported
by documentary as well as testimonial evidence in the record. Thus, Idaho case law dictates that
the district court's findings of fact in this case should only be set aside if they are clearly
erroneous and unsupported by evidence. Viebrock, 125 Idaho at 95 1,877 P.2d at 922.
With respect to the documentary evidence Ward refers to in his Appellant's Brief - the
April 11,2006, probate hearing transcript -the district court, as the finder of fact, interpreted the
same to establish that Justad, through her agent Justad-Hood, gave the magistrate court and Ward
notice that she intended to exercise the option. (Tr., p.115,ll.l-3); (Supp. R., p.34). The district
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court opined that this was adequate notice it and of itself that Justad exercised the option on
April 11, 2006. (Tr., p.115, 11.1-3); (Supp. R., p.34). The district court quoted the following
portion of the transcript in its bench ruling:
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE VOICE: My name is Jodi Justad. I am Claire
Justad's daughter, Phyllis Gasser's last surviving uh, sibling. Um, my mother was
Phyllis Gasser's power of attorney and administrator of her estate for many years.
Uh, this went on um -- Ron Ward uh, because her um, power of attorney and uh,
administrator of her estate without my mother's knowledge. And um, I also -- my
mother told -- my mother has

--

THE COURT: All right. Wait a minute. So, you're objecting, but you haven't
filed any pleadings at all with the Court.
MISS JUSTAD: No. I'm here just to hear what I -- I was not sure what this court
date -- what this court was -- about. And I flew here from Boise last night. Um,
my point is, is that my mother sold some -- that my mother owns a -(Tr., p.113, 11.8-24) (emphasis added). From this exchange, the district court found that JustadHood attempted to give notice to Ward and the Court of Justad's intent to exercise the option but
was cut off by the Magistrate Court before she could get it out.4 (Tr., p.114, 11.23-25) ("were it
not for Judge Friedlander's interruptions, the statement [to exercise the option] would've been
clearly made"). Such a factual finding is a reasonable interpretation of the transcript in and of
itself. However, contrary to Ward's assertions, the district court's finding in this respect was not
made in a vacuum and based solely on the transcript, but rather is and was supported by other
substantial and competent evidence in the record.
For example, Justad-Hood presented sworn testimony, via Affidavit, that she attempted to
inform the Court of Justad's intent to exercise the option: "At the [April 11, 20061 hearing, I
attempted to inform the Court my mother's intent to exercise the option to purchase." (Justad-

In addition to finding that Ward received notice of Justad's intent to exercise the option on April 11, 2006, the
district court found that Ward had a duty to tell the magistrate judge that Justad-Hood was present at the hearing to
express Justad's intent to exercise the option, and not to object to the appointment of a personal representative. (Tr.,
pp.120-121); (Supp R., p.34).
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Hood Aff., R., p.80). Testimonial evidence was also presented by Justad who testified that she
sent her daughter, Justad-Hood, as her representative to give notice to the court and the personal
representative, should one be appointed, that she was exercising the option.' (Tr., p.36,ll.l-16);
(Justad Aff., R., p.76).

Furthermore, it was an undisputed fact that Justad-Hood was her

mother's duly appointed power of attorney. (Justad-Hood Aff., R., p.80);(Tr., p.113, 11.5-6).
The district court also found that Justad had no other reason for sending Justad-Hood to Coeur
d7Alene to attend the April 11, 2006 hearing on her behalf because Justad was not a devisee
under Decedent's will, nor was she an heir of Decedent. ( T , p.113 11-5) This finding by the
district court is supported by Decedent's will, which was a part of the record, and the testimony
of Ward, the administrator of Decedent's estate, who testified that neither Justad nor JustadHood were beneficiaries under Decedent's Will. (Tr., pp.83-84). The sworn testimony of Justad
and Justad-Hood, as well as the other above-mentioned evidence, is substantial and competent
evidence which supports the district court's finding that Justad exercised the option on April 11,

Furthermore, it is undisputed that Ward was present at the April 11, 2006, hearing, that
he knew and recognized Justad-Hood as Justad's daughter, that he knew Justad had an option to
purchase the option property, and that he heard what said by Justad-Hood at the hearing. (Tr.,
p.84, 11.3-13); (Tr., p.83, 11.6-8). Given the evidence, the district court found that Ward received
notice of Justad's intent to exercise the option on April 11,2006:
I . . . find that in fact Ron Ward knew who Jodie was. She was [Justad's]
daughter. Knew that [Justad] had bought from and paid for an option years before
from [Decedent] and her husband, knew that Jodie came bearing [Justad's] power
of attorney, and that Jodie made that all clear to Ron Ward, the man who at the
April 1lth, 2006, hearing, was seeking to become the personal representative and
the man who would later become the personal representative at the June 15th
5

Justad was physically unable at the time to attend the April 11,2006 hearing personally due to injury. (TI., p.36,
11.1-16); (Justad Aff., R., p.76).
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hearing. It was clear on April 11, 2006, that [Justad] was giving notice to Ron
Ward, and I find as a matter of fact and law that there was no other interpretation
that Ron Ward could've come away from that hearing with, so I find that the
option was exercised, accepted on April 11,2006.
(Tr., p.115, 11.4-17); See also (Supp. R., p.33). Thus, the district court's holding that Ward
received notice of Justad's intent to exercise the option on April 11, 2006, is supported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record, and thus should not be overruled on appeal.

(b)

The district court's finding that Ward received notice of Justad's

intent to exercise the option on April 11,2006, is supported by and consistent with
Idaho law.
With respect to the issue of notice, and whether Ward received notice of Justad's exercise
of the option, this Court has stated that "[c]onstructive notice is ordinarily meant that a person
should be held to have knowledge of a certain fact, because he knows other facts from which it is
concluded that he either did in fact know, or ought to have known, the fact in question."

Pflueger v. Hopple, 66 Idaho 152, 157, 156 P.3d 316, 318 (1945). Additionally, both this Court
and the Idaho Court of Appeals have provided that "[wlhatever is notice enough to excite the
attention of a man of ordinary prudence and prompt him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of
all such facts as a reasonable investigation would disclose." Fenton v. King Hill Irr. Dist., 67
Idaho 456, 466, 186 P.2d 477, 482 (1947); Farrell v. Brown, 111 Idaho 1027, 1033, 729 P.2d
1090, 1096 (Ct. App. 1986). "Whether a party has notice of circumstances sufficient to put a
prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, and whether by prosecuting such inquiry he
might have learned such fact, are questions of fact for the court or jury." Pflueger, 66 Idaho at
158, 156 P.3d at 318.
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The district court correctly found that Ward was chargeable with notice of Justad's intent
to exercise the option as of April 11, 2006, given the facts presented in the record, and set forth
in more detail above. Under this Court's holding in Pfleuger, a party has constructive notice of a
fact when that party has actual knowledge of certain other facts from which it can be concluded
that Defendant either did in fact know, or should have known, of the fact in question. 66 Idaho
at 157, 156 P.3d at 318. In this case, Ward had constructive notice of Plaintiffs intent to
exercise the option as of April 11, 2006, because as a result of Ward's attendance at the April 11
hearing, Ward either did know or should have known that Justad intended to exercise the option
given that that he knew and recognized Justad-Hood as Justad's daughter, that he knew Justad
had an option to purchase the option property, and heard what said by Justad-Hood at the
hearing.
Furthermore, under the Court's holding in Fenton, a party is chargeable with notice of all
the facts a reasonable investigation would have disclosed where the facts and circumstances
would excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence. 111 Idaho at 1033, 729 P.2d at 1096.
Surely the facts and circumstances here would have excited the attention of Ward and should
have at the very least prompted him to inquiry as to why Justad, through her representative,
attended the April 11,2007 hearing. A reasonable investigation by Ward in this case would have
revealed that Justad desired to exercise the option. As a result, the district court correctly found
that Ward received notice on April 11,2006, that Justad intended to exercise her option.
As it turns out, Ward had a good reason to sit back and refrain from inquiring as to why
Justad, through her representative, attended the April 11, 2007 hearing. It was revealed at trial
that Ward not only administers Decedent's estate, but stands to inherit under the terms of
Decedent's Will. (Tr., p.128,11.2-4); (Supp. R., p.31). Evidence was presented, and the district
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court found, that Ward stands to inherit one-third of the option property under Decedent's Will in
the event Justad failed to exercise the option. (Tr., p.128,11.2-4); (Supp. R., p.31). In fact, Ward
did more than just sit back; Ward took certain bad faith measures to prohibit Justad from
exercising the option.
For example, David Keyes, who was familiar with Justad, Decedent, and Ward, testified
at trial and via affidavit that Ward "asked him not to tell Mrs. Justad that she had an option on
the property," and that Ward "stated that he hoped that Mrs. Justad would forget about the option
and fail to exercise it." (Keyes Aff, R., p.2, 710 & 1I); (Tr., p.78, 11.4-8 & 11.1 1-17). The
district court found the testimony of David Keyes to be relevant (Tr., p.127, 11.8-13), and more
importantly found Keyes testimony to be credible, specifically more credible than Wards. (Tr.,
p.128, 1.19); (Tr., pp.127-128).

This Court has held that it will not reweigh the evidence or

consider the credibility of witnesses on appeal. Huffv. Singleton, 143 Idaho 498, 501, 148 P.3d
1244, 1247 (2006). Thus, there clearly existed motive for Ward to refrain from inquiring as to
why Justad, through her representative, attended the April 11, 2007 hearing, even though a
reasonable investigation by Ward in this case given the facts and circumstances on April 11,
2007, would have revealed that Justad desired to exercise the option. In sum, the district court
correctly found that Ward had notice - either actual, constructive, or inquiry - of Justad's
exercise of the option on April I I, 2006.

C.

In addition to finding that Justad timely exercised the option on April 11,2006, the
district court correctly found that, in the alternative, Justad exercised her option on
June 15,2006.
As set forth in detail above, the district court correctly found that Justad exercised her

option on April 11, 2006. However, in the alternative, the district court also found that Justad
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timely exercised her option on June 15, 2006, as a matter of law because up until that time there
was no one to give notice to regarding the option since no personal representative had been
appointed. (Ti-., p.115-118); (Supp. R., p.34-35). Ward argues that the district court erred in so
holding. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11).

However, Ward fails to present or cite to any legal

authority or case law addressing the issue of to whom Justad should have given notice given that
the option contract was silent as to such term and the grantors of the option are deceased.
Under Idaho law, "[tlhe interpretation of a contract begins with the language of the
contract itself." Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26, 137 P.3d
409, 413 (2006). If the language of the contract is unambiguous, then its meaning and legal
effect must be determined from the language of the contract. Id. If, however, the language of
the contract is ambiguous, the interpretation of the contract document is a question of fact which
focuses on the intent of the parties. Id. "A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretations." Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185, 75 P.3d 743, 746
(2003). The goal of contractual interpretation is to determine and effectuate the parties' mutual
intent at the time of contracting. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 361,93
P.3d 685,692 (2004).
In this case, the option contract at issue is silent as to whom notice of exercise should be
given in the event of the Gassers' [Optionors'] death. Silence as to a term in a contract creates
an ambiguity. See e.g., Dante, 121 Idaho at 151, 823 P.2d Idaho at 185 ("ItJhe lease option
contains no reference to the qualifying process or to a release of liability. This omission creates
an ambiguity"). A reading of the option contract in its entirety indicates that it was the mutual
intent of the parties at the time of contracting that notice be given to the estate's personal
representative. This reading is corroborated by Justad's sworn testimony, which established that
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it was her understanding that if the optionors were to pass away, she was to provide notice to the
court appointed personal representative or trustee of her intent to exercise the option. (Justad
Aff., R., p.75,7 12) (Supp. R., p.32).
Furthermore, is has been held that when determining the intention of the parties to a
contract, the agreement must be construed as a whole and considered in its entirety. SpencerSteed v. Spencer, 115 Idaho 338,345, 766 P.2d 1219, 1226 (1988). The language of the option

contract itself states that should Justad elect to exercise the option following the death of the
optionors, "said election shall be binding upon the Personal Representatives and Trustees and
Estates of the GASSER'S."

Since the election is expressly made binding upon Decedent's

personal representative and trustee, it is reasonable to conclude that the parties intended notice he
given to Decedent's personal representative or trustee.

Given the above, a reasonable

interpretation of the parties' intentions at the time of contracting is that the parties intended that
Justad would give notice to the court-appointed personal representative of the Decedent's estate
should Justad wish to exercise the option following the death of the optionors.
Idaho courts have not addressed the issue of whom notice should be given where the
option contract is silent to such term and the optionors are deceased. Where the Idaho courts are
silent on a given issue, it is instructive to look to guidance from other jurisdictions. In the Estate

of Baker v. Lahrman, 505 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ind. App. 1987), the court held that "notice of the
exercise of a real estate option is sufficient if given to the estate's attorney or personal
representative." In Baker, the decedent, James Baker, gave an option to purchase certain real
estate to the plaintiffs, Donald and Noreta Lahrman. Id. at 104. The option was to expire on
March 15, 1985 at 12:OOp and provided that the plaintiffs "may exercise the Option by giving
notice to [Baker] before the expiration of the option." Id. James Baker died prior to the

RESPONDENT'S / CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF
L:\~JUSTAD025389\APPEAL00002\PLDG\BRFS\RESPONDENTS
BRIEF-040108-PRH-PJS.DOC

expiration of the option. Id, at 105. The option was silent as to who was to receive notice of the
plaintiffs' exercise of the option in the event of Baker's death. Id.
After Baker's death, but prior to the expiration of the option, the plaintiffs gave notice of
their intent to exercise the option to the personal representative of Baker's estate. Id. Baker's
devisees refused to honor the option, arguing that the option was not properly exercised because
notice should have been given directly to them, the heirs, rather than the personal representative.
Id. The court disagreed, opining that:

It would be unfair to require a real estate optionee to give notice of the exercise
directly to the distributees. One problem with such a requirement is the fact that
while title passes immediately, to whom it passes and the interest which passes
remains undetermined until the estate is closed.

Because the judicial determination of to whom title has passed and the interest
which has passed does not occur until final distribution, the optionee will not
know who is to receive notice of the exercise until theJinal decree is entered.
Id. at 106 (emphasis added). Thus, the court rejected the devisees argument that notice must be

given directly to the heirs, as such a requirement would be unfair to the optionee, holding that the
better rule is to have the optionee give notice to the personal representative of the decedent's
estate. Id. at 107.
In this case, the district court found that there was "simply nothing in the record to show
that [Justad] knew who the heirs were under the new will or fore sure [sic] who the personal
representative was under the new will." (Tr., p.116-117).

The district court also found that

there was no evidence presented that Ward mailed Decedent's will to Justad. (Supp. R., p.35). It
is undisputed that Ward was not appointed by the Magistrate Court to be the personal
representative of Decedent's estate until June 15, 2006, the same day that Justad gave Ward
notice of her intent to exercise the option. (Plaintiffs Ex. 14; (Tr., p.43); (Justad Aff., R., p.76).
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Any proposition that Justad should have given notice to Ward prior to his court
appointment as personal representative because he was designated as such in a decedent's will is
un~ound.~
Namely, because a person who is designated or nominated personal representative in
a will may, or may not, be subsequently appointed as such by the court under the probate code.
Kessler, 130 Idaho 105,937 P.2d 417 (1997). Idaho Code 9 15-3-103 conditions appointment on
qualification, a discretionary judicial determination. It likewise depends on the willingness of
the designated person to serve. Furthermore, the duties and powers of a personal representative
do not commence until his or her appointment. I.C. § 15-3-701 (emphasis added). Thus, an
optionee will not know who is to receive notice of the exercise until the court makes a judicial
determination of who will be appointed to be the personal representative of the estate. Thus, the
district court did not err in holding that Justad timely exercised the option as a matter of law on
April 15, 2006, given that the personal representative of Decedent's estate was not appointed as
such until such date.
The bottom line in this case is that the express language of the option contract clearly
establishes that it was the Decedent's intent that her sister, Justad, have the option to purchase
the lake front property described in the option following the death of herself and her husband.
Furthermore, it is clear that Justad desired and intended to exercise the option to acquire the land
described in the option following Decedent's death but did not know how to go about exercising
the option due to the option's silence with respect to such matters. However, despite the absence
of guiding language in the option or guidance from Idaho case law, the evidence establishes that
Justad made good faith attempts to convey her intent to exercise the option.

Specific

performance, being in equity, must be determined by the particular facts and circumstances of
each case, and as such is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. McCandless v. Schick, 85
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Idaho 509, 517, 380 P.2d 893, 897 (1963). Given the evidence presented in this case, the
equities involved, and the clear intentions of the parties to the option contract, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in granting Justad's request for specific performance of the option
contract.
D.

The district court erred in denying Justad's request for attorney's fees below.
Following court trial, Justad, as the prevailing party, requested that the district court grant

her request for attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code

$5

12-120(3) and 12-120(1). (Supp. R.,

p.8-27). The district court held a hearing on the issue of attorney's fees on December 17, 2007,
and following the presentation of argument by the parties, decided to take the matter of fees
under advisement. (Supp. R., p.30).

The district court subsequently entered its written

Memorandum Decision and Order on January 11, 2008, denying Justad's requests for attorney
fees. (Supp. R., pp.30-41). Justad appeals the district court's decision to this Court, via crossappeal, arguing that the district court erred in denying her request for attorney's fees. (Supp. R.,
pp.42-44).
Idaho Code

5

12-120(3), compels an award attorney fees to the prevailing party in any

civil action to recover on a commercial transaction. Commercial transaction has been defined as
"all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." I.C.

5

12-120(3). The

test for application of this statutory directive is whether the commercial transaction comprises
the gravamen of the lawsuit, that is, whether the commercial transaction is integral to the claim
and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover. Brower v. E.I. DuPont
De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780,784,792 P.2d 345,349 (1990).
Furthermore, this Court has indicated that where a transaction involving a piece of real
property is undertaken for "investment purposes," such a transaction may he considered a
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commercial transaction for the purposes of Idaho Code ij 12-120(3). Cannon v. Peruy, 144 Idaho
728, 732, 170 P.3d 393, 397 (2007). In Cannon, two parties who had testified that they had
purchased certain real property for "investment purposes" appealed the district court's decision
to award attorney fees against them pursuant to Idaho Code ij 12-120(3). Id. at 73 1, 170 P.3d at
396. The two appealing parties argued that the transaction in that case - their purchasing of a
piece of residential real property for friends who could not obtain financing pursuant to the
understanding that the friends would rent from them until the friends could purchase the property
themselves - was not a commercial transaction since the property was to be used for residential
purposes. Id. This Court stated that because the two appealing parties had testified that they
were buying the property for "investment purposes" the district court correctly found that the
transaction was a commercial transaction under Idaho Code 5 12-120(3). Id.
In this case, like in Cannon, Juslad's decisions to enter into the option contract and to
exercise the option were made for investment purposes, and thus constitutes a commercial
transaction under Idaho Code ij 12-120(3). In the district court's Memorandum Decision and
Order, the oourt found that Justad had lived in Boise for many years (since 1949) despite the fact
that she has owned over 113 acres in Harrison since 1979, and that as a result, Justad had no
intention of moving to Harrison to utilize the option property for residential purposes. (Supp. R.,
pp.35-36). To the contrary, Justad testified that she wanted the option so her son could develop
the property and have more income for himself. (Supp. R., p.36); (Tr., p.26-27). As a result, the
district court stated in its Memorandum Decision and Order that given Justad's testimony, "[tjhe
exercise of the option and the resulting purchase was an investment."

(Supp. R., p.39).

Notwithstanding, the district court denied Justad's request for attorney fees. (Supp. R., p.41).
Because Justad's decision to enter into the option contract and to exercise the option was made
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for investment purposes, the district court erred in denying Justad's request for attorney's fees
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3).
Justad also argued below that she was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 12-120(1), which provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in any
action where (1) the amount pled is $25,000 or less, and (2) written demand was made on the
defendant not less than 10 days before the commencement of the action. (Supp. R., p.10). In this
case, Justad did not plead any dollar amount in her complaint, but rather merely made a request
for specific performance of the option contract. (R., pp.108-111). Thus, the amount pled in this
case was less than $25,000. Additionally, it was undisputed that on June 15,2006, Justad made a
written demand on Ward through her counsel demanding exercise of the option. (Plaintiffs
Exhibit 14); (Tr., p.85, 11.9-25). Said written demand was made more than 10 days prior to the
filing of the pleading on which the bench trial was held, Justad's Second Amended Complaint
for Specific Performance, which was filed on September 20, 2006. (R., pp.108-11 I). Thus, the
district court erred in denying Justad's request for attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12120(1).

E.

Justad is entitled to recover her attorney fees and costs on appeal.
Pursuant to Idaho Code

$9 12-120(1) and 12-120(3) and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and

41, Justad is entitled to an award of her costs and attorney's fees on appeal. Justad reasserts and

incorporates by reference those arguments made above that Justad is entitled to attorney fees (1)
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) because Justad's decision to enter into the option
contract and to exercise the option was made for investment purposes, and thus constitutes a
commercial transaction; and (2) pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(1) because the amount pled in
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this matter was $25,000 or less, and written demand was made on the defendant not less than 10
days before the commencement of the action.
In addition, Justad seeks attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code r) 12-121 and
Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, on the grounds that this appeal brought and pursued
frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation, since Ward did not have grounds or
foundation to argue that the district court abused its sound discretion by deciding to grant
Justad's request for specific performance.

F.

Ward has waived any claim he may have had to recover any attorney's fee at the
district court level or on appeal, and as such is barred from seeking attorney fees.
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) provides that a parties Appellant's Brief "shall contain the

contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefore,
with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." This
Court has consistently interpreted Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) to preclude a party's ability to
recover attorney fees where he or she does not raise the issue in his or her opening brief on
appeal. See e.g., Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 669, 115 P.3d 756, 760 (2005) (holding
"[wlhen the opening brief contains no authority on an issue present [attorney fees], it is
immaterial that the party provides authority either in a reply brief or in a supplemental briefing
because the issue has already been waived"); Weaver v. Searle Bros, 131 Idaho 610, 962 P.2d
381 (1998) (both parties waived any award of attorney fees by failing to argue their contentions
in argument portion of their appellate briefs).
In this case, Ward failed to make any request, present argument, or otherwise contend
that he has any claim to recovery attorney's fee at the district court level or on appeal in his
Appellant's Brief. (See Appellant's Brief). Thus, as a matter of law, Ward has waived any
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argument he may have that he is entitled to attorney fees at the district court level or on appeal,
and thus is barred from seeking attorney's fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justad respecthlly requests that this Court affirm the district court's decision to
specifically enforce the option contract. In addition, Justad respectfully requests that this Court
ovemle the district court's decision to deny Justad's request for attorney's fees below. Last,
Justad respectfully requests that this Court grant her request for attorney's fees and costs on
appeal.
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